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The LHWCA, and judicial supervision by the Supreme Court under the
general right to review judgments of state courts, however, satisfies the
federal interest in uniform compensation systems for longshoremen."0 As
a result, state law should continue to control litigation resulting from
land-based torts.
In Sea-Land, the Fourth Circuit has charted an uncertain course for
admiralty jurisdiction. Future courts in the Fourth Circuit must deter-
mine not only whether the alleged tort occurred on navigable waters but
also whether the tort bears a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity."' The district courts in the Fourth Circuit will have
broad discretion in resolving whether an alleged tort occurred on land or
water. This broad discretion, coupled with the possibility of disparate
fact situations, may lead to anomalous decisions in the future. 2
JOHN DAVID PADGETT
III. BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Multiple Homestead Exemptions
The exemption provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 19781 permit a debtor to protect certain property from creditors'
ment of trade by increasing the confidence of merchants in their ability to conduct business
successfully. See Federalism and the Admiralty, supra note 58, at 160. The interest in the
free flow of commerce appears to be the touchstone of the federal interest in uniform
maritime principles., See Uniformity in the Maritime Law, supra, at 133; accord, THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
' See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961). The LHWCA furthers the
federal interest in providing uniform and certain recovery for employment-related injuries
of longshoremen. See GMMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at § 6-26, at 410; MARITIME INJURIES,
supra note 15, § 55. The Supreme Court initiated the process of judicial review of state
court decisions to promote a unified application of the law, treaties, and Constitution of the
United States in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 362 (1816).
6" See note 31 supra. The Fourth Circuit has reflected a discretionary approach in
determining when to assert admiralty jurisdiction. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662
F.2d 234, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1981). The Johns-Manville court held that the installation of
asbestos products on vessels constitutes a significant relationship to a traditional maritime
activity. Id. at 239-40. The Fourth Circuit noted that if a manufacturer designed, marketed,
and advertised a product as maritime in nature, admiralty jurisdiction is proper. Id. at 240.
2 See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1979). Under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the com-
mencement of bankruptcy proceedings creates an estate comprised of the debtor's legal and
equitable interests at the time the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy with the bankruptcy
court. Id. § 541(a)(1). Section 522 permits the debtor to exempt certain property of the estate
from forced sale for payment to creditors. Id. § 522.
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claims.' Section 522(b)(1) of the Act, however, allows states to prohibit resi-
dent debtors from claiming exemptions under the federal homestead
statute.' Consequently, the Virginia legislature enacted a state homestead
2 Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L. J. 779, 779 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Vukowich]. The first exemption laws in the United States paralleled exemptions
recognized under early English common law. Id. at 782. England's laws forbade creditors
from taking a debtor's clothing, bedding, tools of trade or other essentials of life. Id. Subse-
quent exemption laws worked to alleviate the effects of the 18th and 19th century economic
depressions when families of all economic classes lost their homes and possessions. Id. at
783. The purpose of current exemption laws is to provide the debtor with basic necessities
to protect the debtor and his family from destitution and to prevent them from becoming a
public charge. See H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, 126, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. By leaving a debtor
with sufficient property to maintain economic independence, exemption laws encourage a
debtor to earn income to pay his creditors. Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes-The
Need for Reform and a Proposed Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Ulrich].
The House Report indicates that Congress designed the exemptions of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act to leave a debtor with adequate property to begin a new life free from
creditor harassment and excessive debt. House Report, supra, at 125-26, [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6086-87. The House Report expressed concern that many state exemp-
tion laws fail to leave a debtor in bankruptcy with sufficient assets to begin a life free from
debt. Id. at 126, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6087. Both the House and the
Senate, however, recognized the states' interest in regulating credit and agreed to permit
states to set exemption levels appropriate to different parts of the country. Id.; S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5792
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; see text accompanying note 47 infra. The House bill,
therefore, suggested a $10,000 homestead exemption and allowed a debtor to choose be-
tween state and federal exemptions. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1977). The Senate
rejected the provision permitting the debtor to choose exemptions. Senate Report, supra, at
6, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5792. The Senate declined to permit a couple in a
joint bankruptcy case to retain the substantial amount of property the couple could accum-
ulate if a husband chose state exemptions and the wife chose the federal exemptions. Id.
The exemptions in § 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act provide a compromise between the
House and Senate bills. 124 CONG. REC. S. 17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). Section 522(d) grants
a homestead exemption of $7500, but under § 522(b)(1) states may forbid residents from
choosing exemptions under § 522(d). 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1979); see text accompanying note 47
infra. By permitting states to disregard federal exemptions and enact state exemption
statutes that reflect different standards of living throughout the country, Congress arguably
is undermining the uniformity Congress sought in enacting the federal homestead exemp-
tion. Duncan, Through the Trap Door Darkly; Nebraska Exemption Policy and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 60 NEBR. L. REV. 219, 224 n.27 (1981).
3 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1979). According to § 522(b) of the Act, a debtor may exempt
property under either § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act or under the applicable state's
exemption statute. Id. A state may preclude resident debtors from choosing the exemptions
under § 522(d). Id. If the state prohibits debtors from choosing exemptions under § 522(d),
the debtor may claim the applicable state exemptions, plus nonbankruptcy federal exemp-
tions. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A). Nonbankruptcy federal exemptions include 46 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Cum.
Supp. 1981) (wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices exempt from attachment); 5
U.S.C. § 8346 (1980) (civil service retirement benefits exempt from legal process); 38 U.S.C.
§ 3101 (1979) (veterans' benefits exempt from legal process); 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1976)
(Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits ex-
empt from legal process); 45 U.S.C. § 352(3) (1976) (Railroad Retirement Act annuities, pen-
sions, and benefits exempt from legal process).
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exemption statute,4 which required Virginia residents to exempt property
under the Virginia statute and precluded debtors from exempting prop-
erty under the federal homestead provisions.' The Virginia homestead
exemption permits any householder or head of a family to exempt $5000'
of real or personal property from the claims of creditors.' Under the
Virginia statute, any married or unmarried individual who maintains a
separate residence, whether or not the individual supports any depen-
dents living with him, qualifies as a householder The Fourth Circuit
VA. CODE § 34 (1976 & Gum. Supp. 1981). The current Virginia homestead statute
allows any householder or head of a family to choose $5000 worth of his real or personal
property to exempt from lien, distress, garnishment, or sale. Id § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Although state homestead statutes traditionally discriminate in favor of homeowners, the
Virginia statute allows renters to select personal property to protect from the claims of
creditors. Id.; see Ulrich, supra note 2, at 138-39. Federal exemptions also permit renters to
retain personal property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1979).
VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). When the United States Congress designed
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the drafters expressed concern that many states had
not revised their exemption statutei in this century. House Report, supra note 2, at 126,
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6087. The Virginia legislature, however, has raised
the dollar amount of the exemption several times and has expanded the definition of
householder to include single, separated, and divorced individuals. Compare VA. CODE § 34-4
(1976) (householder may exempt $3500 real or personal property) with VA. CODE § 34-4
(Cum. Supp. 1981) (householder may exempt $5000 real or personal property); compare VA.
CODE § 34-1 (1976) (householder must support dependents living with him) with VA. CODE §
34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (householder may claim homestead exemptions whether or not he
supports dependents living with him).
' VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The original Virginia homestead statute allowed
debtors to protect $1200 worth of property from debtors' claims. Act of the General
Assembly 1866-67, at 962. In 1975, the Virginia legislature raised the exemption from $2000
to $3500. VA. CODE § 34-4 (1976). In 1977 the exemption increased to $5000. VA. CODE § 34-4
(Cum. Supp. 1979). Some commentators suggest that the legislature should link the dollar
amount of the homestead exemption to an index that fluctuates with the purchasing power
of the dollar. Ulrich, supra note 2, at 141; Comment, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 466, 471 (1938). The
dollar amount of property protected would then adjust to meet the current cost of living. 26
CALIF. L. REV. at 471.
7 VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981); see text accompanying note 4 supra.
' VA. CODE § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Virginia courts originally interpreted the term
householder in the homestead exemption to signify an individual supporting dependents liv-
ing with him. See, e.g., Richardson v. Woodward, 104 F. 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1900) (married
woman who manages family business and is regarded as head of family by dependents is
householder although husband lives with her); Epperty v. Holley, 3 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 27
(1917) (unmarried infant who lives with and supports dependent mother is householder); Op-
penheim v. Myers, 99 Va. 582, 587, 39 S.E. 218, 219 (1901) (married woman who lives alone is
not householder); Calhoun v. Williams, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 18, 23 (1879) (unmarried man with
no children or other dependents living with him is not householder). But cf. Wilkerson v.
Merrill, 87 Va. 513, 519-20, 12 S.E. 1015, 1016-17 (1891). In Wilkerson, the Virginia Appeals
Court granted a grandfather the exemption despite the death of his grandson, the grand-
father's only dependent. Id. at 519, 12 S.E. at 1015. The court arguably granted the grand-
father the homestead exemption in response to substantial proof that a creditor murdered
the grandson to deprive the grandfather of the exemption. Id. at 514-15, i2 S.E. at 1015. A
1978 amendment to the Virginia homestead statute eliminated the requirement that a
householder support dependents living with him. VA. CODE § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979); see In
re Doan, No. 80-01365, slip op. at 3 n.1 (E.D. Va. June 22, 1981); In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823,
825 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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Court of Appeals recently construed Virginia's homestead statute to
grant householder status to both a husband and wife who lived toge-
ther.'
In Cheeseman v. Nachman,'° Oliver and Isabelle Cheeseman lived
together in the home they owned as tenants by the entirety.1" Both Mr.
and Mrs. Cheeseman held jobs, 2 and both contributed funds to their
household.'3 In June of 1980 the Cheesemans filed a joint petition in
voluntary bankruptcy. 4 Although the Cheesemans filed a joint home-
stead deed," each independently claimed a homestead exemption equal
to each spouse's one-half interest in the property they held by the entire-
ties." The trustee in bankruptcy challenged Mrs. Cheeseman's exemp-
See Cheeseman v. Nachman (In re Cheesman), 656 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1981).
Before Cheeseman, Virginia courts interpreted the Virginia homestead statute to grant one
homestead exemption to a husband and wife who lived together. See In re Thompson, 4 B.R.
823, 825 (E.D. Va. 1980). Before 1978 the exemption statute defined householder as
equivalent to "head of a family," and required the householder to financially support
dependents who live with him. VA. CODE § 34-1 (1976). The terms "householder" and "head
of a family" generally connoted a husband who-earned wages to support dependents.
Dickens v. Snellings (In re Snellings), 10 B.R. 949, 952-53 (W.D. Va. 1981). In Snellings,
however, the bankruptcy court granted a homestead exemption to both a husband and wife
who lived together in their jointly owned home. Id. at 954. The Snellings court found that in
modern society the terms "householder" and "head of a family" no longer refer only to a
husband. Id. at 953. Although the Virginia legislature eliminated the requirement that a
householder occupy a separate residence, the crucial factor for householder status arguably
is an individual's status as a wage earner. See Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Cheeseman v.
Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]; text accom-
panying note 77 infra.
,0 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 61; see text accompanying note 16 infra.
, 656 F.2d at 61. Before the Cheesemans filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Cheeseman was
temporarily unemployed due to a strike. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 5. During the
strike only Mrs. Cheeseman worked outside the home to support the family. Id.; see text ac-
companying note 44 infra.
656 F.2d at 61.
14 Id. A debtor commences voluntary bankruptcy proceedings by filing a petition in
bankruptcy with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1979). When a debtor and the deb-
tor's spouse file a single petition with the bankruptcy court and declare themselves jointly
bankrupt, the court considers the petitioners joint debtors and consolidates the debtors'
estates. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1979). See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 302.01 & .02 (15th ed.
1981).
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 5.
" 656 F.2d at 61 n.2. The Cheesemans had $4700 of equity in their family home when
they filed for bankruptcy. See Appendix at 18, Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]; text accompanying notes 67-69 infra. The Cheesemans
also jointly owned a savings account and several state and federal income tax refunds. Ap-
pendix, supra, at 18. Mr. and Mrs. Cheeseman each claimed $2813 as one-half interest in all
of the jointly held property. Id.
The Cheesemans owned their residence, savings account, and income tax refunds as
tenants by the entirety. Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act exempts property held by the en-
tireties if the state exempts entireties property from creditors' claims. 11 U.S.C. §
522(b)(2)(B) (1979). Virginia law, however, permits creditors to claim entireties property to
satisfy claims against a husband and wife who are jointly liable for their debts. Vasilion v.
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tion"7 and argued that since together the Cheesemans occupied only one
household,18 Mrs. Cheeseman did not qualify as a householder under the
statute."9 The bankruptcy judge held that Mrs. Cheeseman failed to
qualify as a householder or head of a family under Virginia law and
denied her the homestead exemption. 0
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit the Cheesemans contested the
refusal of the bankruptcy judge to grant householder status to Mrs.
Cheeseman.2 ' The Cheesemans advanced two arguments to refute the
bankruptcy court's decision to limit them to one homestead exemption.2
First, the Cheesemans emphasized that the Virginia homestead statute
grants exemptions to a householder rather than to a household.3 The
Cheesemans reasoned that the Virginia legislature sought to expand the
definition of householder to include all individuals who earn wages.24
Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). The Cheesemans could not have ex-
empted their entireties property since they were jointly liable on many of their debts. Ap-
pendix, supra, at 8-10.
11 656 F.2d at 62. The trustee in bankruptcy challenged only Mrs. Cheeseman's
qualifications as a householder or head of a family. Id. The Cheesemans argued that an in-
terpretation of the term householder which precluded the possibility of a household contain-
ing two or more householders violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment by discriminating against wives. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brief for Appellant,
supra note 9, at 17-18. The Cheesemans apparently assumed that if the Fourth Circuit decid-
ed to grant a married couple a single homestead exemption, the court would grant the
homestead exemption to the spouse who earned more wages. After asking the court to take
judicial notice that in most families the husband earns more wages, the Cheesemans argued
that granting the homestead exemption to the spouse who earned more wages
discriminated against wives. Id. at 18.
s 656 F.2d at 61.
19 See Brief for Appellee at 5, Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. In Cheeseman, the trustee in bankruptcy relied on
In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823 (E.D. Va. 1980), to support his assertion that'the Virginia
homestead statute granted a single exemption to a husband and wife who occupied the same
residence. Brief for Appellee, supra, at 5. The Thompson court held that the statute's
separate residence language precluded a married couple living together from claiming two
homestead exemptions. In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823, 825 (E.D. Va. 1980). In Cheeseman, the
Fourth Circuit declined to follow the decision in Thompson, since the Thompson court relied
exclusively on state law. 656 F.2d at 62 n.4; see text accompanying note 25 infra. The Fourth
Circuit in Cheeseman instead relied on the Bankruptcy Reform Act as well as state law in
granting the Cheesemans two homestead exemptions. 656 F.2d at 63.
656 F.2d at 62.
21 Id.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 7-17.
= Id. at 7-9; Ulrich, supra note 2, at 138-39.
14 Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 8. The Cheesemans contended that the Virginia
legislature used the terms "householder," "laboring person," and "individual" inter-
changeably in the Virginia homestead exemption statute. Id. Section 34-29 of the Virginia
exemption statute limits the amount of a debtor's wages a creditor may garnish in a
Virginia court to 25% of an individual's weekly wages or the amount by which his earnings
exceed 30 times the minimum wage, whichever is less. VA. CODE § 34-29 (1976). Section 34-32
permits a creditor to institute proceedings in a foreign court against a laboring person or a
householder only for the amount specified in § 34-29. Id § 34-32 (1976). Although the Virginia
19821
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Second, the Cheesemans contended that the Federal Bankruptcy Reform
Act required the court to grant Mrs. Cheeseman the homestead exemp-
tion.' The Cheesemans argued that while states may preclude debtors
from claiming exemptions under section 522(d) of the Act,26 states must
comply with the other provisions of section 522.1 Section 522(b)(2)(B) of
the Act exempts property held by the entireties from creditors' claims
to the extent that state law protects entireties property. 8 Under
Virginia law, creditors may not reach property held by the entireties to
satisfy claims against a husband or wife individually.29 In addition, sec-
tion 522(m) of the Act makes the exemption provisions applicable to each
individual debtor in a joint bankruptcy." The Cheesemans concluded,
garnishment statutes protect an individual's wages in a Virginia court and a householder or
laboring person's wages in a foreign court, the Cheesemans reasoned that the legislature in-
tended to protect all individuals who earn wages. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 8.
Since the homestead statute grants an exemption to a householder, the Cheesemans sought
to extend the interpretation of householder derived from the garnishment statute to the
homestead statute. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 4. The trustee in bankruptcy
opposed extending the definition of householder to include all wage earners and stressed
that the homestead and garnishment statutes remained separate exemptions. Id. Despite
three amendments to the homestead statute during the past decade, the legislature has not
expanded the householder definition to include individuals. Id.
1 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 14-16. The Cheesemans argued that the
United States Constitution empowers Congress to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy
thoughout the United States. Id., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Since Congress enacted a
specific provision for exemptions in § 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the Cheesemans
urged the court to interpret Virginia's homestead exemption law as consistent with the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 14-15; see 656
F.2d at 63. See also International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (states may
not pass or enforce laws that interfere with Congressional bankruptcy regulations).
26 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1979).
2 Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 14, 16; Dickens v. Snellings (In re Snellings), 10
B.R. 949, 954 (W.D. Va. 1981). In Snellings, the bankruptcy court decided that although Con-
gress permitted states to replace the exemptions specified in § 522(d) of thd Act with state
exemptions, states still must give effect to § 522(a)-(c) and (e)-(m). Id. The Snellings court in-
terpreted § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act to permit debtors to avoid a lien to the ex-
tent that the lien impaired their homestead exemption. Id. at 955. Correspondingly, under §
522(b(2(B) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the Cheesemans could exempt their property
held by the entireties if Virginia law protected property held by the entireties from
creditors' claims. See text accompanying note 29 infra (entireties property exempt from
claims against one spouse alone). But see text accompanying note 16 supra (entireties prop-
erty not exempt if spouses are jointly liable for debts); text accompanying notes 36 & 37
infra (state law did not protect Cheesemans' jointly held property).
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1979).
Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 16. Virginia law immunizes property held by the
entireties from claims of creditors against either the husband or wife alone. Vasilion v.
Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). Since § 522(m) of the Act grants exemp-
tions to each individual debtor in a joint case, the Cheesemans alleged that the Act exempt-
ed their jointly held property. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 16-17. See also In re
Thacker, 5 B.R. 592, 596 (W.D. Va. 1980) (debtor need not be householder to claim entireties
exemption).
-1 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1976).
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therefore, that their jointly held property was exempt from creditors'
claims under sections 522(b)(2)(B) and 522(m) of the Act, regardless of the
Virginia exemption statute."'
The trustee in bankruptcy stressed that the Cheesemans' bank-
ruptcy petition designated exemptions only under the laws of Virginia. 2
The trustee urged the Fourth Circuit to examine only Virginia law to
determine whether the Cheesemans were entitled to two homestead ex-
emptions." When the Virginia legislature amended the homestead ex-
emption statute in 1979, the legislature declined to grant the exemption
to any individual, but required instead that a householder maintain a
separate residence to receive a separate exemption. 4 The trustee con-
tended that the legislature's amendment eliminated the possibility of a
household containing more than one householder and thus limited each
household and all of its occupants to a single $5000 exemption.35 The
trustee also refuted the Cheesemans' argument that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act shields property held by the entireties from creditors'
claims." When a husband and wife are jointly liable on their debts,
Virginia law permits a creditor to reach any jointly held property to
satisfy claims against both spouses. 7
The trustee failed to persuade the Fourth Circuit to deny Mrs.
Cheeseman householder status and thus limit the Cheesemans to a
single homestead exemption.' The Cheeseman court noted ambiguity in
the language of the Virginia exemption statute39 and therefore adopted
' See Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 17; text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
, See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 8. On their bankruptcy petition the
Cheesemans exempted property pursuant to the laws of Virginia. See Appendix, supra note
16, at 15. The Cheesemans each claimed exemptions under Virginia Code § 34-29. See VA.
CODE § 34-29 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (maximum portion of wages subject to garnishment); Id. §
34-26 (poor debtor's exemptions); Id. § 34-4 (homestead exemption of householder).
Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 7.
' VA. CODE § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 5-6.
Id. at 9-10. Virginia law restrains creditors from reaching jointly held property to
satisfy claims against a husband or wife individually. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740,
66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). A creditor may, however, reach jointly held property under
Virginia law to satisfy claims against both spouses. Id.; see Ragsdale v. Genesco, 7 B.C.D.
574 (E.D. Va. 1981) (trustee may reach entireties property of joint debtors). Since the
Cheesemans were jointly liable on their debts, state law did not protect their jointly held
property. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 9-10.
I Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951); see text accompany-
ing note 36 supra.
" 656 F.2d at 62.
s, Id. at 63. The Fourth Circuit in Cheeseman discussed two possible interpretations of
the Virginia homestead exemption statute. Id. One interpretation of the statute grants
householder status to one person in each residence since the others in the household do not
maintain other separate residences. Id. Another interpretation of the statute permits any
individual who contributes to the maintenance of the household to claim the homestead ex-
emption. Id. The Cheeseman court noted that under the second interpretation the court
would regard both a husband and wife who lived together, but apart from their parents, as
maintaining separate residences. Id.
1982]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
the Virginia policy of construing exemption statutes liberally in favor of
debtors.4" Since the purpose of exemption laws is to preserve the family
home,41 the court favored the interpretation of the statute most likely to
permit the Cheesemans to retain their home.42 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that a construction of the statute which demanded that house-
holders maintain separate residences would encourage couples with
financial difficulties to separate to claim exemptions." The Cheeseman
court decided that granting a homestead exemption for each spouse who
contributed to the maintenance of the home44 would encourage couples to
stay together during financial trouble and allow them to retain their
equity in the family home after bankruptcy.45
The language and policies of the Bankruptcy Reform Act also influ-
enced the Fourth Circuit to grant the Cheesemans two homestead ex-
emptions." The Cheeseman court decided that although section 522(b)(1)
of the Act permits a state to preclude residents from invoking the
federal exemptions,4 7 section 522(m) specifies that the provisions of the
Act apply to each debtor in a joint bankruptcy.4" Thus, according to the
" Id. Although the Virginia legislature originally enacted the homestead exemption
statute to protect the debtor's immediate family from destitution, Virginia courts generally
interpret the statute liberally to aid both individual debtors and their dependents. Compare
Calhoun v. Williams, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 18, 21 (1879) (homestead exemption exists solely for
family's benefit) with In re Wilkes, 2 B.C.D. 957, 957 (W.D. Va. 1976) (grandfather who felt
morally obligated to support grandchildren is householder although he lived apart from
them) and Wilkinson v. Merrill, 87 Va. 513, 519-20, 12 S.E. 1015, 1016-17 (1891) (householder
may claim exemption despite death of all dependents).
" 656 F.2d at 63. Since homestead exemption laws are designed to permit families to
protect their homes from creditors' claims, most states draft homestead exemption lawls to
grant the exemption to the homestead. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (Cum. Supp.
1980) (homestead of 160 acres of farmland or one acre in city exempted from forced sale
under process of law); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (homestead worth
up to $20,000 exempted from forced sale).
42 656 F.2d at 63. But see text accompanying notes 67-69 infra (single homestead ex-
emption would permit Cheesemans to keep their equity in their home).
41 656 F.2d at 63; see In re Thompson, 5 B.C.D. 1302, 1303 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 4 B.R.
823 (E.D. Va. 1980). In Thompson the bankruptcy judge decided that couples who sought
double exemptions to protect their homes might stay in a rented room or at a friend's home
for a day to fulfill the separate residence requirement. Id. The question remains whether
staying with a friend for a day qualifies as "maintaining" separate residence. See text ac-
companyinf notes 67-69 infra.
" 656 F.2d at 63. The Fourth Circuit in Cheeseman emphasized that each spouse con-
tributed to the maintenance of the home. Id. Mrs. Cheeseman's status as a wage earner is
the only factor that distinguishes Cheeseman from In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823 (E.D. Va.
1980). In Thompson, the trustee objected to Mrs. Thompson's claimed exemption because
she was not gainfully employed. In re Thompson, 5 B.C.D. 1302, 1302 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 4
B.R. 823 (EDl. Va. 1980). The district court held that Mrs. Thompson failed to qualify as a
householder and denied her the exemption. 4 B.R. at 826.
5 656 F.2d at 63; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
" 656 F.2d at 63; see text accompanying notes 2 & 30 supra.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1979); see text accompanying note 2 supra.
" 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1979); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
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Cheeseman decision, while state law determines the amount of property
a debtor may exempt, section 522 of the Act controls who may claim an
exemption. 9 The Fourth Circuit held that the Act restricts state
legislatures from denying exemptions to husband or wife in a joint
bankruptcy."0
Other decisions interpreting the Virginia homestead exemption stat-
ute focus on the separate residence language in section 34-1 of the
Virginia statute as indicative of the Virginia legislature's intent to limit
a married couple to a single $5000 exemption. 1 In In re Thompson52 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted
that since Virginia law precludes resident debtors from exempting prop-
erty under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the court need examine the deb-
tors' exemptions only under the Virginia exemption statute.3 The
Thompson court denied dual exemptions to a married couple who oc-
cupied only one home.-" The Thompson court decided that the Virginia
legislature adopted the separate residence language to extend the
homestead exemption to single, separated, and divorced persons,55 but
not to grant double exemptions where two people lived in a single
residence.56 Since only Mr. Thompson worked outside the home, the
court granted him householder status, but denied Mrs. Thompson an ex-
emption. 7
In In re Doan," the bankruptcy court denied the homestead exemp-
tion to each of two unmarried debtors residing together in a condo-
minium they owned as joint tenants.59 The Doan court noted that if the
couple were married to each other and living in one residence, the
homestead statute would entitle them to one exemption." The statute
failed, however, to articulate a standard by which the Doan court could
, 656 F.2d at 64.
'o Id.; see text accompanying note 30 supra.
5, See, e.g., In re Doan, No. 80-01365, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Va. June 22, 1981) (two unmar-
ried debtors residing together fail to qualify as householders); In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823,
825-26 (E.D. Va. 1980) (husband and wife living together in one residence may claim one ex-
emption).
51 4 B.R. 823 (E.D. Va. 1980).
"Id. at 824 n.2; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
4 B.R. at 825-26; see text accompanying notes 19 & 44 supra.
4 B.R. at 825.
s, Id.; see text accompanying note 19 supra; text accompanying notes 63 & 65 infra.
51 4 B.R. at 826; see text accompanying note 44 supra.
' No. 80-01365, slip op. (E.D. Va. June 22, 1981).
5' Id., slip op. at 4. In Doan the debtors shared a kitchen, dining room, living room, and
bath. Id., slip op. at 1. The debtors also maintained a joint checking account and pooled their
resources for household expenses. Id., slip op. at 2. Although the debtors asserted that they
occupied separate bedrooms, seldom dined together and followed different work schedules,
the bankruptcy court denied either debtor the homestead exemption. Id., slip op. at 2 & 4.
The Doan court found that the debtors failed to meet the separate residence requirement.
Id. at 4.
No. 80-01365, slip op. at 4.
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grant one debtor the exemption but deny the other debtor householder
status.6' Accordingly, the court refused to grant a homestead exemption
to either debtor since neither lived in a separate residence. 2
The Cheeseman decision in essence disregards the Virginia
legislative proviso that a householder maintain a separate residence. 3
Senator Frederick T. Gray has stated that the separate residence
language of the Virginia homestead statute was intended to grant two
homestead exemptions only if a divorced or separated husband and wife
lived apart and endured separate household expenses. Although the
Virginia homestead exemption statute grants an exemption to the
householder rather than to the household, 5 the legislature clearly in-
tended to limit a married couple who live together to a single $5000 ex-
emption.6 Even if the Fourth Circuit limited the Cheesemans to one ex-
emption, the single exemption would have allowed-the Cheesemans to
retain the equity in their family home. 7 The Virginia homestead statute
exempts $5000 of a householder's real or personal property,68 and the
Cheesemans had only $4700 equity in their home. 9
The Fourth Circuit interpreted section 522(m) of the Act to require
the granting of the homestead exemption to both husband and wife who
file joint bankruptcy." The Cheeseman court emphasized, however, that
both Mr. and Mrs. Cheeseman earned wages and contributed financially
to the maintenance of the household." According to section 522(m), an in-
dividual need not earn wages to qualify for the homestead exemption 2
The exemption provisions apply separately to both husband and wife
whenever they file a joint bankruptcy petition, regardless of whether
either spouse earns wages. 3
The Virginia legislature successfully avoided discrimination in favor
of homeowners in the state exemption statute by granting the exemp-
tion to householders rather than to households, and by permitting the
debtor to choose the property he wishes to exempt. 4 However, the
Virginia legislature should specify in the statute that when a husband
and wife own property jointly and reside in the same household, one
61 Id., see text accompanying note 17 supra.
62 No. 80-01365, slip op. at 4.
656 F.2d at 63.
Interview with Frederick Gray, Virginia State Senator (September 17, 1981).
VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
See text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra.
'7 See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 infra.
VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
" 656 F.2d at 61 n.2.
70 Id. at 63.
21 Id.; see text accompanying note 44 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 73 infra.
8 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1979).
7' VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (homestead exemption available to householder
who may exempt real or personal property). See also text accompanying note 4 supra.
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